such as marriage, birth, death, or any important status transition as if they occurred in isolation. Status transitions only take on meaning, however, when they are placed in a social context, as significant moments in "the persistent organic interdependency of the cohort-specific life history" (Ryder 1965, p. 290) . The approach we adopt begins by observing regularities in the timing of human events, and ultimately seeks to account for the sequencing of these events in the life span.2 Thus, for example, to make sense of conjugal timing?as we shall try to do in this paper?we must examine the distribution of conjugal careers of age peers. Earliness or lateness of marriage are terms that acquire meaning only when individuals are examined in the context of a particular cohort, or when one cohort is seen in the light of the experience of other cohorts.
There is another sense in which the examination of conjugal timing must be viewed in a social context. The timing of marriage can best be understood when it is related to other status transitions which typically follow or closely precede the entrance to matrimony. A shift in marriage age is a relatively trivial finding unless this change is seen in the context of the timing of other events in the familial career such as entrance to the labor force, establishment of a household, or first birth. Rather than looking at marriage age as a separate demographic or psychological phenomenon, we view it as one feature in the allocation of roles to members of a cohort and in the construction of the life course of the constituents of this cohort (Riley, Johnson, and Foner 1972) .
Placing the question of marital timing in a life-course perspective is easier to do in theory than in practice. The historical data, and even the contemporary data on nuptial age, do not readily fit the type of analysis we are advocating. We are on fairly firm ground in our analyses of the distribu? tion or variation of marriage age over time, but when we take up the rela? tionship of marriage to other life events the data do not always carry us as far as we might like. Our ideal end?to establish changes in the social con? struction of familial "careers" among the members of successive cohorts can only be approached by stretching the historical data to (and perhaps in some instances beyond) its limits. Experience is longitudinal, but both population lists and event lists are rarely in longitudinal form. Our contrived life-course analysis suggests where true longitudinal work might profitably begin, for the meaning of "timing" is visible only when conceived as part of a career and these careers as characteristic experiences of cohorts. sponded to particular constraints and options at critical junctures in their life courses, we have some basis for assessing their preferences and predilections. In so doing, we may gain some sense of how individuals actively responded to changing opportunities. Second, shifts in the construction of the life course themselves become an impetus for institutional change. As alterations occur in the sequence or timing of life events, other features of society must often be modified accordingly. The timing of marriage, to cite the example we shall explore in this paper, is not merely a reflection of institutional change but a source of change, instigating economic and social innovations (e.g., the provision of married-student housing by universities).
Our principal objective in this paper is to illustrate the value of examining historical data from this perspective. Our analysis follows a stepwise pro? cedure, building out from simple constructs (the transition to marriage) to more complex ones (family formation). Substantively, we shall attempt to show that a significant transformation has taken place in the process of family formation over the past century. The data with which we establish these trends will not permit us to explain with any degree of precision why changes occurred when they did, but the coincidence of events will suggest some possible interpretations.
Our analysis divides into two parts. The first, a descriptive section depicting nuptial trends over the past century, will present data not new to scholars in the field, although sometimes we have organized this material in novel ways. In the second part of the paper, we will show how the changes in nuptial timing which occurred in this century reoriented the whole process of family formation. This discussion will lead us to some plausible ways of interpreting the emergence of the more contemporary pattern of family formation, interpretations we hazard at the conclusion of our essay.
Patterns of Marriage Timing
Though marriage age has long been a topic of speculation in the literature of family sociologists, few scholars took the trouble to assemble quantitative materials from earlier times before Monahan's pioneering though somewhat chaotic study of the subject in 1951. Monahan took previous observers to task for their tendency to treat marriage age as a simple function of indus? trialization and urbanization. Drawing upon the existing data at the time which could be extracted from federal, state, and local censuses, and from state and local vital registration systems, he came to the conclusion that age at marriage in the early United States was essentially the same as in 1890, when U.S. census data on marital status began to permit closer scrutiny.3 Glick (1957) and his collaborators (Carter and Glick 1970) and, 3 The evidence that Monahan uses is quite varied and subject to a variety of biases. We have subjected one of the more substantial sets of these data to a more refined analysis than Monahan was able to perform. A close examination of the Michigan and (1913, 1922, 1933a, 19436, 1953a, 1964a, 1972 This pattern is especially noteworthy in view of the enormous social and economic transformation that occurred in the late-19th and early-20th
centuries. Massive immigration, westward population movement, and both urban and industrial growth left surprisingly little trace on the age at mar?
riage of both males and females during this period. Rather than long-term developments in the economy or composition of the population gradually bringing age of marriage down, it was the widely publicized marriage boom of the 1940s that did so, at an unprecedented rate.
Not only did the period after World War II mark an abrupt decline in marriage age, but it signified another important departure in the timing of marriage. Although in theory the ages at which members of a birth cohort marry could scatter in an infinite number of ways, in fact the distribution assumes a probabilistic form. The shape of this marriage curve is determined by at least two independent parameters, namely, the initial age at which transition to marriage commences for the cohort and the proportion of those who ever wed (Coale 1971; Hernes 1972) .5 When one examines marriage spread?the amount of time it takes a cohort to achieve its maximal proportion ever married?it is clear that an important change has taken place since the 19th century.6 Eliminating the provide first-marriage data for the 19th century. For these reasons, we, like others using state statistical materials for historical inquiry, rely heavily upon Massachusetts even while recognizing its atypicality in degree of industrialization and in some demographic features. Period data which are weaker both conceptually and in coverage are introduced for a very particular reason. We wish to show that the changes in marriage patterns which we describe were neither peculiar to a single region nor merely a function of a complicated population redistribution. We also wish to establish that the timing of the changes is so striking that the points of inflection can be seen in records of marriage events as well as in the marital statuses of individuals. We are looking for trends, not exact measures of levels; and the two data sources ought on the whole to agree, their testimonies to reinforce one another. In the case of age at marriage, the Massachusetts data are also supported by various data from New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Michigan, all cited by Monahan, and by materials from Philadelphia which we were able to examine in con? siderable detail. 6 Coale (1971) assumes the independent "setting" of minimum marriage age, and age for completion of the marriage process, for a given cohort. Hernes's (1972) alternative model for the nuptial process would express our observation as an increase in the initial marriageability, offset by an increase in the deterioration of marriageability with age. two extreme tails?the youngest 10% to marry and the oldest?in the 19th century, it took 15 or more years for 80% of the men who ever wed to marry and roughly 12 or 13 years for the same proportion of women to enter wedlock. Recent data show that there is now much less variation in the age at marriage. The central 80% of the 1925-34 birth cohort of male evermarriers managed the transition in 8.6 years, and the females did so even more rapidly. Table 3 shows the proportion of all marriages which are achieved in the top three modal years of age for the marriage of successive cohorts. These figures provide further corroboration for the conclusion that modality in marriage timing has markedly increased for both men and women, though the changes among the males are again more dramatic (Ryder 1969) .
The data presented in tables 1,2, and 3 not only establish that modality has increased over time but they also help to pinpoint when this change took place. Marriage age did not become more narrowly bounded until after the Second World War, despite the gradual lowering of the median age before 1920. But there was a sharp reduction in the spread of marriage for both sexes in the late 1940s. This trend, of course, corresponded to the conspicuous drop in marriage age which we noted earlier. Up to that point, there had been a remarkable degree of constancy in marriage spread during the previous half century. Although it is difficult to bring the figures up to the recent nents of the trend toward modality are immediately apparent. After the war, little change occurred in the age at which the first tenth of the age cohort married, but a vast amount of change took place in the behavior of the later deciles. Generally, the "late" marriers entered matrimony much earlier than had been the case in previous eras. Except for a few stragglers, the market virtually closed down for women after their midtwenties, and for men by their late twenties. There was a rapid disappearance of eligible bachelors in their thirties, and spinsterhood, the point when women are at an age disadvantage in the marriage market, appears to have come earlier in recent times. The distribution by age and sex of the single and the currently married populations shows dramatically the virtual disappearance of a once-significant part of the population?the single adult. At the same time, the age structure of the married population has shown remarkable stability, owing to the offsetting effects of marriage age and mortality.
Initially, the "marriage rush" which began in the early 1940s affected single people of all ages in much the same way. Marriage probabilities for very young men and women increased especially markedly in the early postwar period as compared with 1940. But even for those who did not marry young, the probabilities of marriage at a later age increased.7 The first phase of the marriage rush, then, reduced the spread partly by giving a special boost to young marriers and partly by simply increasing the propor? tion marrying at all ages including the young. This had the effect, in view of their already relatively high marriage probabilities, of removing eligibles from the marriage market at an earlier point in the life span. At the same time, however, there was no backing away from marriage by the depleted single remnants of the older cohorts.
By the end of the 1950s, a new pattern emerged: while the annual proba?
bilities of marriage for both sexes were still rising, the marriage market 7 These statements are based on the probability-of-marriage tables (with decrement for death) for 1940 and 1948 compiled by Jacobson (1959) . The 1940 table shows a general increase in marriage probabilities over GrabilPs (1945) even though proportions remaining single throughout the reproductive span declined.8 The postwar pattern of more modal marriage, initially a function largely of generally heightened probabilities of marriage, was now reinforced by a new age-specific marriage schedule. Older marriage probabilities became somewhat depressed, absolutely, even as younger singles increased their marriage probabilities. Viewed from a life-course perspective, marriage is always something of a segregation process: those who by a particular age fail to marry find their subsequent chances of ever marrying narrowing each year. Between the postwar rush and the end of the 1950s, this selective process became even more pronounced. Along with the greater degree of uniformity in the marriage timing of individuals came a greater degree of coordination of marriage age between couples. This more or less follows from what we have seen above. As the spread narrowed for both men and women, it might be expected that age difference among couples would drop. Unfortunately, extensive historical data on single-year age-at-marriage differences among couples do not exist. Some fragmentary data reported by Monahan do support the assumption that age homophily in marriage rose in the 20th century. Massachusetts data, presented in table 4, show some movement in the average relationship Saveland and (1969) . Differences in compiling procedure do not affect our generalizations. Retros sample data, from a later survey of economic opportunity, which are somewhat un seem to suggest that in the early 1960s there was a collapsing toward modality the young and old ends of the marriage period (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1970 decline in the standard deviation of the ages of brides who married this modal set of grooms. The process to matrimony now linked mates more nearly similar in age, and did so more uniformly. The increasingly narrow range of brides' ages was, one suspects, a reflection of the changing social settings in which mates were being discovered (school being the most obvious of these).9 At the same time as a shift was taking place in the site of the marriage market, the market itself was becoming more homogeneously age graded. Thus far, we have located several important dimensions of nuptial timing and have observed their change over time. Most of the remainder of the essay will be devoted to investigating the marriage transition in the context of other alterations that were taking place in the whole sequence of family formation. Examining the more complex sequence of family formation will help to elucidate the social meaning of changes we have already observed and may offer certain insights into how and why changes in the nuptial patterns came about.
Structural Contexts of Marriage
The argument that will unfold in the following sections is briefly that there has been a relaxation of constraints upon the ability to marry that allowed the timing of marriage to become increasingly preferential. People have become relatively more free to marry according to preference because structural conditions impose fewer obstacles to matrimony than was once the case. What we have termed "structural" conditions range from the largely extrafamilial and impersonal forces of a marriage market to the very private and personal decisions such as the practice of birth control. Under the rubric of "structural" conditions we include, too, changes in the economic situation of young adults. There is no question that the extraordinary productivity of the United States is connected in some way to its marriage patterns, which by comparison to countries in Western Europe have always been highly youthful. But the commonsense idea that nuptial timing responded directly to an increasingly productive economy is mistaken. The historical record belies any simple translation of gains in productivity 9 RockwelPs examination (1976) of educational homogamy indicates that for nonwhites the strongest tendency away from "random mating" (with respect to educational attainment) occurred shortly after World War II, but that for whites it was a prewar product, after which it declined slightly, before eventually stabilizing. This trend is over and above whatever increased age grading was occurring in educational institutions.
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This content downloaded from 165. budged marriage timing. At the beginning of the 20th century, age at mar? riage declined during two decades of considerable economic growth and then leveled off. But these trends correspond poorly to the inflexible patterns of marriage modality. The war quinquennium was, of course, one of spectacular economic advancement; but it was followed by five years of real decline in disposable income. Only after 1950 or so did the improvement in disposable incomes per capita again increase. Our contemporary timing patterns were established during a period of relative stagnation in the immediate postwar period but have declined relatively little during two decades of rapidly expanding personal resources.
The Marriage Market
Material conditions are not the only structural constraints to contracting marriage at the moment one chooses. One needs to find a suitable mate, and opportunities for courtship vary according to social setting. A way of visualizing these settings is as a marriage market. The demographic charac? teristics of the participants in the market, the cultural rules prescribing the range of suitable matches, and the geographical extensiveness of the market pool together affect patterns of nuptiality. Many individuals, when marriage markets were not very orderly, may have married late because they were unable to find expeditiously a mate they considered suitable (Groves and Ogburn [1928] provide an early empirical examination of marriage markets in the United States). We will only adumbrate here the complex process by which marriage markets became more efficient, confining ourselves to the changing demographic balance in marriage markets. We suspect, however, that in other ways, too (ethnic intermarriage is an example), market inefficiencies have declined over time. In our analysis we employ an age-specific sex ratio for the peak marriage ages (males 25-29/females 20-24) as a crude indicator of local marriagemarket variations. Surely, various refinements could be made in this measure, but it has the virtue of simplicity, and our objective here is merely to identify significant trends.10 For each sex, the ratio reveals local bulges in the popula? tion owing to domestic and international migration and, thus, the basis for local variation in sex ratio. Table 6 presents for dates between 1890 and 1970 the Pearsonian correla? tion coefficients between the proportions of ever-married males 25-29 and females 20-24, and between both of these proxies for the pace of nuptiality and the age-specific sex ratio. In 1890, the sex ratio was strongly correlated with the marriage probabilities of both men and young women: in states where men dominated the ratio, women were more prone to young marriage and the men were less prone. Although other local causes undoubtedly promoted positive correlations between the marriage proneness of the two sexes, these were outweighed in 1890 by marriage-market imbalances, and the correlation between male and female proportions married was signifi? cantly negative. By 1920, this correlation had become weakly positive. The effect of sex-ratio variation upon marriage had diminished for both sexes, and other local conditions affecting marriage now prevailed. By 1940, this covariation was highly significant, and male marriage age was no longer correlated with the sex ratio, although the female marriage age still was. In attenuated form, this pattern persisted to 1970.
Over time, the structural consideration of sex imbalances in local marriage markets ceased to be a factor in the "decision" of when to marry. We may well ask whether the disappearance of this once-potent factor was owing to a general homogenization in state sex ratios.11 There is, in fact, an unmistakable decline in the variance of the sex ratios (both in the 37 states as well as in large U.S. cities). The standard deviation of the state sex ratios was 0.538 in 1890. It was more than halved to 0.155 by 1920, halved again by 1940 to 0.073, and was a mere 0.047 in 1970. A regression analysis indicates 10 Existing census materials would permit the computation of nonmarried sex ratios separately for native white, foreign-born white, and black populations (to reflect the segregation of marriage markets), with attention to urban/rural market segregation. Such refinements are perhaps premature before research on changes over time in the operation of marriage markets. 11 To make sure that the pattern of observed state-to-state relationships was not entirely a function of small states with unusual population and marriage configurations, we exam? ined the numbers of people in states lying beyond the 1 SD point for sex ratio and pro? portions married. Indeed, the 1890 outliers on the high-sex-ratio, low-male-marriage side were generally sparsely populated Western states. But from 1920, the extreme states took in large populations, who were affected by variations in the workings of the marriage market.
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This content downloaded from 165. The basis for "decision" about marriage timing has changed, then, from involuntary to preferential, from a structurally constrained to an individually determined basis. Yet, the rationalization of the marriage market?at least as we have measured it here?had not led before World War II to a contraction of marriage spread. If, as literary evidence would lead us to expect, most people wished to marry in their early and middle twenties,12 why did not modality increase when marriage markets seemingly permitted more uniformity? We have only some possibilities to offer. One is suggested by the pattern of annual variation in nuptiality over the past century. Cycles were more placid in the late 19th century than in the early 20th, even before the extreme swings of the Great Depression (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1971, pp. 2-3). Postponements of marriage may have become more common in the early-20th century when economic prospects were favorable, resulting in a greater marriage spread. Alternatively, the "new immigration,, may have imposed a greater degree of market segregation than had previously existed.
Changes in the Relationship of Marriage and Headship
As the traditional marriage-market effects on marriage age declined, other determinants replaced them. Part of the evolution toward this new pattern in the postwar period involved an altered relationship between the timing of marriage and other related transitions. The new basis for nuptial timing is part of a general reorganization in the sequence of family formation which begins with the relationship between marriage and household headship.
If we assume, as a casual examination of contemporary data might suggest, that the marriage transition implies a simultaneous transition into independent household status, we will miss an important element of histori? cal change in family formation. While it is true that the greatest part of the timing of headship can be explained, at least in a statistical sense, by marriage, the two transitions are conceptually distinct. The extent to which there has been a pause between the two transitions has varied considerably over time. Though today they are usually accomplished simultaneously, even now a brief pause often separates marriage from headship.
12 This statement is based on an examination of late-19th-century popular fiction, newspaper writing, marriage manuals, and sermons, carried out by seminar students in 1975. None of these sources suggested that marriage ought to be deferred beyond the midtwenties for women or beyond the late-twenties for men.
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This content downloaded from 165. The two transitions were, however, far from perfectly related. In fact, age at marriage declined considerably more sharply than did age at headship, which seemingly was less flexible. (It may well be that in discussing headship we are also in an indirect way talking about the provision of housing, and housing is dependent on a wide variety of supply factors quite apart from demand.) By juxtaposing the headship and marriage rates we can derive an estimate, shown in table 8, of the minimum proportion of married men at given ages who were not yet household heads. The actual proportion was Age 1890 Age 1930 Age 1940 Age 1950 Age 1960 Age 1970 14 (15) 19436, 1953a, 1964a, 1973a Because table 8 shows minima only, we present in table 9 the figures we can derive for the actual proportion of married men who were not household heads. As the estimates have led us to expect, the 19th-century pattern of a looser timing relationship between marriage and headship persists halfway into the current century. In more recent years, a far more precise sequencing predominates. The postwar pattern, to be sure, reflects previous preferences which often had to be held in abeyance for lack of resources. The 1940 census materials (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1943e, p. 33) show convincingly that among the segment of young marrieds the poor and unemployed most often failed to establish an independent residence.15 Even today, some young people who might wish to marry and establish an independent household still cannot afford to do so. The point is that now far more than in previous times the two transitions are supposed to be timed together. Since at least 1940, then, marriage not closely followed by headship attainment was generally a product of an insufnciency of resources on the part of newlyweds. This led us to suspect that the increasing coordination of Further evidence pertaining to this hypothesis is presented in table 10, which provides figures on the headship status of young married males who were and who were not in the labor force. These data allow us to determine whether the greater degree of simultaneity between marriage and household headship was occasioned by a closer coordination between marriage and entrance to the labor force. The table clearly shows that the tie between marriage and labor-force participation has become less crucial than was once the case. Regardless of their employment status, most married men today are more likely to be household heads. The waning tie between labor-force entry and the transition to marriage and household headship obviously cannot be explained by a diminished need for resources. Wherewithal surely is still required to afford an independent household. But young couples have been able to find resources elsewhere?often no doubt from wife's earnings but sometimes, too, from parental loans or contributions. Th increasingly modal timing of marriage and the growing expectation of prompt sequencing of marriage and headship required other flexibilitie In order to achieve these ends, couples have been prepared to innovate sometimes in ways formerly unavailable or unacceptable.
Thus, new patterns were created, and older ones disappeared. Temporary coresidence of married couples with parents, long a source of flexibility, 1940 1950 1960 1970 1940 1950 1960 1970 Table 11 provides an estimate of the prevalence of "doubling up" (newlyweds who Extension, at least insofar as it has affected newlyweds, has not been a historical constant. Whether or not we wish to regard the decline of the practice of "doubling up" as a significant departure in the history of Ameri?
can kinship, we cannot completely ignore its implications for family life.
Even if coresidence was experienced only briefly by most people, it commonly affected newlyweds at a critical juncture in their lives and at a time in which significant patterns of interaction were being formed. As we have seen, 19th-century levels of extension persisted into the very recent past; and, as with the timing of marriage, World War II marks a dividing line between an earlier form of behavior and the one that many have come to believe has long been with us.18 16 In this respect as in many others, black families now resemble 19th-century families in their form and strategies. In 1970, regardless of the age of their heads, about three times the proportion of black families as of white were extended. The stigma now attached to this accommodation has a nice irony, considering how common it was in the white popula? tion only a generation ago (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1973c, pp. 237-38). 17 We have three sets of data bearing upon the question of independent residence for young couples, which include information on interval since marriage. These data are from Philadelphia in 1880, which we will assume to stand well enough for 19th-century urban behavior (probably on the high side of coresidence with parents); from a Current Popula? tion Survey taken in April 1948 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1948) near the height of the postwar marriage boom; and from the decennial census of 1970. Each shows a sharp gradient toward independent residence as length of marriage increases. In 1948 when the housing squeeze was intense, no fewer than one-third of all who married within the year, of whatever age, were not yet household heads. In 1970 as in 1880, the proportions were lower, but even for 1970 the proportions without their own households among those who had recently married was high enough to allow us a rough guess that one in five or so contemporary grooms live for a while outside of their own households, most typically in extended families. The estimate we might derive from 1880 was that about one-third experienced extension at some time. Viewed longitudinally, headship attainment is con? siderably more complex a process than it would seem from cross-section alone. 18 Once again we owe an intellectual debt to Monahan, who in a brief note (1956) The rarer of the two sequences, beginning with premarital pregnancy, no doubt influences the timing of marriage, though it is not easy to calculate the precise effects of premarital conceptions on nuptial timing. Premarital sexual activity seems to have sharply increased after the Second World War, contributing to far larger numbers of "forced" marriages (Smith 1973) . The decision to marry was for quite a substantial number of marriers preempted by earlier and less considered choice. The abrupt postwar departure from past patterns of marriage timing thus included an element of increased individual control over sexuality.
In the more common sequence, in which marriage precedes conception, anticipated childbirth is a less direct but no less important determinant of marriage timing. The expectation of prompt childbirth undoubtedly in? fluenced the decision of when to marry. As long as the interval between marriage and first birth was more or less fixed, there had to be greater flexibility in the staging of transitions related to marriage. (We have already seen how the integration of marriage and headship was eased early in the 20th century in order to "purchase" a slightly lower age at marriage.) The 20th-century emergence of flexibility in the period between marriage and first birth drastically altered the trade-offs customarily made in the process of family formation. In this respect, at least, the increasing availability of contraception bears analogy to the more efficient operation of the marriage market and the rapid expansion of available housing, both of which served to remove preexisting structural constraints on the marriage decision, thus making nuptial timing more responsive to individual preference.
Evidence to this effect is presented in table 12, which shows the very large changes that occurred in the percentage of all women, 20-24 or 25-29 and married less than three years, who had given birth to at least one child. The age groups vary together closely and change a great deal from date to Between 1940 and 1960, a rapid shortening of the interval between mar? riage and first birth took place, approaching the patterns set in 1910. Only a part of this shift can be accounted for by the rising rates of premarital pregnancy. Changing preferences seem to have dictated the rest. Given the choice, most young married couples once again virtually merged the two transitions. The equally rapid shift between 1960 and 1970 back toward the 1940 pattern shows that this aspect of the larger change was a relatively temporary phenomenon. As preferences increasingly prevail in the timing of family building, rapid fluctuation becomes more possible and, we suspect, more likely.
The postwar period brought a sharp decline in the median age of first birth due in part to a much reduced marriage age for women but also, as we have seen, to a greater proclivity for a closer articulation between marriage and childbearing. The transformation that occurred in the age of females at the birth of their child, and its relationship to changes in marriage age, is shown in table 13. The increase in age at first birth between 1928 and 1948, along with the concurrent slow decline in marriage age, reflects the greater conscious delay of the first birth.20 In addition, the modality of age at first birth had greatly increased by 1960. The transition to parenthood was becoming increasingly age graded, just as was marriage. (Interestingly enough, the tendency toward increasing uniformity remained strong at least through 1970, despite the decline in the birth rate during this period, which might well have resulted in a widening of the spread in the age at first birth.)
The postwar movement toward greater modality in the period between marriage and first birth has two components. The first, as we have seen, is a movement toward a more standard interval between marriage and first birth. But a second and equally important development is the growing trend for late and early marriers to behave similarly. Before 1940, age at marriage was significantly related to the length of the interval between marriage and childbirth. As is shown in centage of those still childless, at given marriage durations. Generally, the differences dwindle after the war, following increases between 1910 and 1940.
Viewed from this perspective, we see that the general hesitation about committing oneself to childbirth that obtained in 1940 did no thing to erase the strong relationship that had been present, at least in 1910, between age at marriage and first childbirth. Indeed, this association was strengthened 20 The 1917 figure perhaps belies this observation. The data upon which the figure however, may be faulty in that they alone are tabulated by five-year age groups. T 19th-century data that we know to exist concerning age of mother at first birth a Michigan in 1884 and 1894. These are published in one-year age groups and show by comparison with 1910. Prior to World War II, it would seem, the timing of marriage set the terms of other familial events. Age at marriage was an important career contingency, affecting the pace of the transition to parenthood. But, after the war, marriage age ceased to have a continuing effect on the timing of parenthood. As never before, the matrimonial decision, itself, now subsumed one's past.
Marriage and Female Labor-Force Participation
The slight decline in marriage age in the first half of the 20th century can be seen as partially facilitated by two transformations: the continuing acceptability of coresidence with kin, and the ability and desire to delay child?
bearing after marriage. To some extent, certain components of the transition to adulthood (independent residence, the rapid movement to childbearing) were for a time subordinated to young marriage. Though initially a housing shortage inhibited the establishment of uniform sequence of family formation in the postwar period, soon a rapid expansion of the housing stock and the continuation of a delay between marriage and first birth allowed most to follow the trend toward more uniform marriage ages. At least one more feature of the life course was modified, as table 15 shows, (1907, 1923, 1943d, 19556, 1963, 1973d 20-24-year-old women, the age group in which the marriage surge wa concentrated, an enormous increase occurred in labor-force participation, an increase which has not subsided even to date.
Conclusion
Seen from a life-course perspective, we have argued that important features of the 19th-century pattern of family formation in the United States lasted at least until World War II. Despite such widely recognized changes in family-related behavior as the gain in income per capita, the completion of the demographic transition, the steady extension of school careers, and the emergence of a postparental period, young men and women typically left their parents' homes, married, and set up their families over very nearly the same parts of their lives in 1940 as they had for the previous half-century. During the war and in the postwar period, the timing of marriage and its relationship to other transitions altered markedly. Once in place, the postwar pattern itself was surprisingly persistent, though we are forever catching distant early warnings of its cracking: widespread premarital cohabitation, increased single parenthood among the young, a new valuation for "childless" marriage, and a return to more complex household forms. We offer no prognostications but wish to reiterate that we have observed, using varied and sufficiently reliable sources of data, that abrupt change followed a relatively lengthy period of stasis. It could well happen again.
We have located a significant historical transformation in the American family but have not provided a satisfactory explanation for the changes which have been depicted. To do so would require a detailed chronology of the wartime and postwar transition in marriage age, with attention to local variations. With due appreciation for the complexities of providing this sort of account, we shall conclude by sketching some of the considerations that may have figured in the transformation. Our interpretation takes into consideration both changing structural conditions and alterations in prefer? ences in the postwar period, events which may have helped to dislodge the pattern of family formation carried over from the previous century.
The Great Depression was severe enough and long enough that, unlike S143 Toward the end of the war, a certain degree of uneasiness was reflected in the family literature as to whether servicemen might have lost the necessary "domestic skills" to maintain stability in the family. The enormous surge of marriages in the early postwar period provided reassurance that men had not lost their taste for matrimony. While there was an active campaign for marriage education in the schools, the church, the home, and the office of the marriage counselor, marriages contracted at ages that once would have seemed too young were rarely condemned in the postwar period. Experts expressed confidence, however, that the marriage rush was a temporary phenomenon. They were wrong. 25 We do not believe that wartime experience as such permanently changed marriage preferences and thereby marriage practices, though it must be regarded as at least a logical possibility. A more theoretically compelling explanation would detail underlying structural alterations. The present paper cannot pretend to isolate these, but it seems likely that some combination of three dimensions are at the heart of the changing pattern of family formation: shifts in the degree of age grading, rearrangements in the family economy examined over the family life cycle, and new institutional bases for life-course decisions.
Age grading in American society has tightened significantly in two respects, both of which imply closer coordination in the timing of behaviors (like marriage) among age peers. Despite the expansion of higher education and the lengthening of educational careers, school departure has nonetheless become more modal. Between 1940 and 1950 more young people stayed in school until high school graduation and seem to have done so at a rather more uniform age, even though the educational attainment generally became more varied within successive cohorts during this same period (Rockwell 1976) . Thus, the percentage of males, 18-20 years of age, who had ceased their education after four years of high school was 27.5% in 1940 and 32.3% in 1950.26 Moreover, for young men, the wartime and peacetime conscription (or at least the possibility of it) was a powerful agency for creating cohort self-consciousness.27 (The peacetime draft, of course, is over; the constraints that structure lives continue to change.)
The 19th-century family economy, as we have noted, typically took a cooperative form at various stages in the family life cycle. From one point of view, this was no less true after World War II than before?despite the proliferation of new families. The proportion of urban families with two or more members in the labor force remained around 32% in 1930 and 1940 , rose to 34.5% in 1950 , and then to 43.8% in 1960 and 52.1% in 1970 1955a, pp. 2A-31; 19646, pp. 5-9; 1973e, p. 13) . A 1947 Current Population Survey inquiry into the subject showed virtually identical distributions of husband-wife families by numbers in the labor force in 1947 as in 1940 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1946 Census -1947 .
Yet looked at more closely, a shift was taking place within this continuing 26 From level of education by age data and cross-sectional enrollment-by-age data (see U.S. Bureau of the Census 1943c, 1953c). 27 The conjunction of the draft, school-departure timing, and the timing of marriage is treated in a thought-provoking way by Winsborough (1975 Winsborough ( , 1976 in a series of unpublished papers based on recent longitudinal and retrospective data. Winsborough speculatively emphasizes the effects of the draft on the higher male marriage modality and greater youthfulness in the postwar period, and argues that cohort-by-cohort variation in this period can be explained by the effects of cohort variation in military service, working through age-specific probabilities of marriage in and out of the service. This, Winsborough suggests, can have operated virtually independently of any changes in preference. Indeed, Winsborough's model fits the postwar period rather neatly, despite its exclusive focus on male experience. We doubt, though, that it could alone explain the sharp transformation which took place in the decade of the forties. Indeed, the age-specific marriage patterns Winsborough's model presupposes are postwar, and are themselves products of the melodrama and underlying structural changes we are discussing.
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This content downloaded from 165. These patterns are quite complex, and no descriptive account?certainly not one so sketchy as ours?can untangle the labor-market and familyeconomy considerations that went into the marked reordering of priorities reflected in these figures. The critical conclusion, however, seems unmistakable: a changing and again vibrant economy made available the jobs that permitted a novel integration of work and family roles, a manifestation of which was the postwar age-at-marriage pattern.28
A final aspect of family economy is far harder to get at but has the ad? vantage of leading us toward institutional changes. The prewar collaborative family depended, especially in times of distress, on the economic contribu? tions of adult offspring, who typically remained in the home. Under postwar conditions, however, when prosperity made young people residentially independent at an earlier age, the direction of economic dependency may have reversed (on net, that is, for exchanges in both directions still exist and no doubt always have) (Hill 1970) . A charming piece of historical ethnography, we suspect, would be to recreate the development (in the postwar period, probably) of the variety of ritual falsehoods by which parents subsidized the marriages of their children, who would have been both too young and too dependent to marry by the standards of an earlier generation.
The overall effect of institutional change in the war decade, apparently, was to redistribute benefits in an age-specific manner, with the consequence of promoting earlier and more modal marriage patterns. The most obvious of such institutional innovations were the G.I. Bill of Rights and Social Security. The redistributions affected by both of these governmental innovations increased decision-making flexibility and thus had an impact 28 Moreover, we suspect that not only were the performers of work roles changing in a way that altered the pattern of family formation, but also the jobs available to young people influenced the transition from the family of orientation to the family of procreation. The occupations which provide stable, predictable careers appeared to increase over the 1940s and in many cases to be available to new entrants to the labor force. This age group also seems to have improved their average annual earnings at an especially lively pace over the period, and these earnings improvements may well have been invested in the establishment of independent households. Again, these observations are tentative and call for far more intensive analysis, fortunately of data that exist in profusion (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey, P-60, annually; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1943/).
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This content downloaded from 165. From the perspective of the individual, the postwar period appeared to pose fewer impediments to arranging the life course ad lib.31 As individuals gained the resources to schedule decisions according to their own personal timetables, they did so more uniformly than before. From the vantage point of any cohort, at least after the immediate postwar period, life-course choices became more modal. We do not wish to insist, however, that the new timing of marriage inevitably bound the individual into a more determinate conjugal career than was the case in previous times. A more prescribed course of family formation did not preclude subsequent flexibility in the familial career. Perhaps, as Ryder (1969, p. 116) suggests with regard to fertility, the new modality of family formation will increasingly bind cohort histories to "questions of fluctuation rather than of trend."
In this paper we have kept narrowly to first entrance to the married state, ignoring divorce. We suspect that our discussions of modality and timing would have been considerably different, reversed perhaps, if our concern were not first but final marriage. And, lest our argument create another 29 The original bill provided one year of schooling for veterans who had served 90 days and who were not older than 25 at time of entry. In addition, it provided one year of schooling for every year of service up to a maximum of four subsidized years. The bill provided for payment of fees, tuition, books, and supplies, and carried a monthly subsistence payment of $50 for single veterans and $75 for married veterans. Both payments were soon increased.
Home, farm, and business mortgages were easily and generously financed under the G.I. Bill. Fully $14.5 billion was transferred to veterans under the various titles of the G.I. Bill, affecting more than 7.5 million veterans (Olson 1974) . 30 The influence of the Social Security System on the timing of marriage can best be seen as part of a larger long-term shift that led to greater economic independence of older people from those younger. Changes in intergenerational transfers are hard to document, but beginning in about 1950 older people began to receive increasing sums from extrafamilial sources. Expressed in constant 1966 dollars, average income for a married couple on Social Security rose from $1,720 in 1941-42, to $1,930 in 1951, to $2,900 in 1962 . At the same time, beneficiaries who had adult children in their households declined from 34% in 1941-42 to 17% in 1957, and the proportion of recipients who also received financial assistance from relatives and friends dropped from 11% to 3%. Private pension plans, in general, affected increasing numbers after 1950. Both public and private plans, though benefits were not widely distributed, were "in place" at war's end (Merriam and Skolnick 1968) .
unattainable "world we have lost," just beyond our memories, of individuals who lacked our current burden of timing marriage correctly, let us recall that such changes are rarely irreversible.32 What we have observed, after all, may well be but a fluctuation.
